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LeclercLoader - 14/10/2012 12:54 PM
#21

^
keknya terlalu gede buat di tangkringin di carrier tuh gans, kalo angka 0 nya tambah 1 bakal lebih sakti tuh
omsaction - 14/10/2012 05:38 PM
#22

Quote:
Original Posted By LeclercLoader
^
keknya terlalu gede buat di tangkringin di carrier tuh gans, kalo angka 0 nya tambah 1 bakal lebih sakti tuh


pastinya take off di darat gan..
btw ada yg menarik nih, helixnya liaoning
Spoiler for cek
All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier

This aircraft is equipped with the L-band NNIIRT E-801ME Oko AEW&C radar system. The large antenna folds flush against the fuselage for cruise, takeoff and landing, this arrangement permitting a large aperture size with high gain. The E-801ME is a pulse Doppler design, employing a 96 element planar array antenna, arranged in four rows of 24 elements, with electronic beamsteering in elevation and mechanical beamsteering in azimuth. This radar operates in AEW, ASuW/ASW and interleaved modes. In its AEW mode, it has cited range of up to 135 NMI against airborne targets, and 81 NMI against fighter RCS targets. source
merkapa - 14/10/2012 06:06 PM
#23

Visi seorang panglima kharismatis PLA di era 80-an memang mengiginkan agar PLA menjadi kekuatran blue water navy dari konsep mereka brown water navy yaitu menitikberatkan pertahanan pantai dengan fregat dan perusak rudal didukung dsengan ratusan KCR dan SSM yang berpangkalan di pantai hasil doktrin Sovyet tahun 60-an.

Dan tidak mudah mengubah doktrin yang mencengkarm kokoh selama 4 dekade. Kesempatan terbuka setelah para petinggi PLA melihat video desert storm dan bubarnya Uni Sovyet di era 90-an

Hasil bubarnya Uni Sovyet menyebabkan peralatan perang Uni Sovyet terbagi ke semua pecahannya. Adalah Ukraina yang ketiban pulung mewarisi kapal yang masih jauh dari selesai ini. Akibat keterbatasan dana maka kapal dibiarkan mangkrak.

Tiongkok pun mengaml langkah cerdik untuk mengakusisi kapal kosongan ini, di tahun 1992-1996, melalui perusahaan jadi2an mereka memborong kap[al induk heli Kiev dan Minsk untuk dijadikan hotel dan kasino terapung.

Tentunya sebelum masuk operasional sudah masuk dapur beberapa galangan kapal besar untuk dipelajari. namun karena dianggapa tak memenuhi syarat, maka melalui sebuah perusahaan kecil di Hongkong tahun 1998 Varyag diakusisi dengan alasan dijadikan kasino.

Tiongkok bahkan harus membangun kasino terapung dari beton dengan bentuk Varyag untuk menjadikanbukti bahwa Varyag memang dijadikan kasino.

Kenyataannya Varyag malah masuk kandangnya di galangan kapal Dalian, propinsi Liaoning. Dan kapal ini dilakukan pembanguinan pesat serta dipeljari betul2, Dan setelah 14 tahun jadilah kapal Induk Liaoning dengan tujuan latih bagi awak PLAN. sepertinya Tiongkok lebih tertarik dengan konsep Prancis seperti Clemencau dan Charles De gaule yang menggunakan catapult untuk meluncurkan pesawat dibanding konsep Rusia.Ini disebabkan sistenm Catapult dapat mendorong pesawat dengan muatan BBM dan senjata penuh beda dengan sistemn di Varyag saat ini.
Untuk itulah mereka menjalin kerjasama dengan Brazil dalam pelatihan awak dan tentunya dengan diam2 dengan prancis tentunya sebagai pemasok setia PLA sejak tahun 1970 an
Kimak.Kaw - 14/10/2012 06:08 PM
#24

Nanya dong Oom... Carrier ginian Biaya Operasionalnya berapaan tuh ? ... ngacir:
H312ditya - 15/10/2012 01:31 PM
#25

Quote:
Original Posted By Kimak.Kaw
Nanya dong Oom... Carrier ginian Biaya Operasionalnya berapaan tuh ? ... ngacir:


kl carrier ga bisa diitung sendiri, tp ama battlegroupnya jg, soalnya terlalu riskan kl barang mewah macam gini tanpa perlindungan battlegroup, bisa jd sitting duck kapal selam tetangga iseng dan biayanya mgkn setara 5 alphard kali yah skali jalan2 :matabelo itupun cmn battlegroup (kapal2nya doang) blm biaya operasional isi carriernya malus vanuatu sanggup kah? ngacir:
Vienna.SL - 15/10/2012 01:57 PM
#26

Quote:
Original Posted By merkapa
Visi seorang panglima kharismatis PLA di era 80-an memang mengiginkan agar PLA menjadi kekuatran blue water navy dari konsep mereka brown water navy yaitu menitikberatkan pertahanan pantai dengan fregat dan perusak rudal didukung dsengan ratusan KCR dan SSM yang berpangkalan di pantai hasil doktrin Sovyet tahun 60-an.

Dan tidak mudah mengubah doktrin yang mencengkarm kokoh selama 4 dekade. Kesempatan terbuka setelah para petinggi PLA melihat video desert storm dan bubarnya Uni Sovyet di era 90-an

Hasil bubarnya Uni Sovyet menyebabkan peralatan perang Uni Sovyet terbagi ke semua pecahannya. Adalah Ukraina yang ketiban pulung mewarisi kapal yang masih jauh dari selesai ini. Akibat keterbatasan dana maka kapal dibiarkan mangkrak.

Tiongkok pun mengaml langkah cerdik untuk mengakusisi kapal kosongan ini, di tahun 1992-1996, melalui perusahaan jadi2an mereka memborong kap[al induk heli Kiev dan Minsk untuk dijadikan hotel dan kasino terapung.

Tentunya sebelum masuk operasional sudah masuk dapur beberapa galangan kapal besar untuk dipelajari. namun karena dianggapa tak memenuhi syarat, maka melalui sebuah perusahaan kecil di Hongkong tahun 1998 Varyag diakusisi dengan alasan dijadikan kasino.

Tiongkok bahkan harus membangun kasino terapung dari beton dengan bentuk Varyag untuk menjadikanbukti bahwa Varyag memang dijadikan kasino.

Kenyataannya Varyag malah masuk kandangnya di galangan kapal Dalian, propinsi Liaoning. Dan kapal ini dilakukan pembanguinan pesat serta dipeljari betul2, Dan setelah 14 tahun jadilah kapal Induk Liaoning dengan tujuan latih bagi awak PLAN. sepertinya Tiongkok lebih tertarik dengan konsep Prancis seperti Clemencau dan Charles De gaule yang menggunakan catapult untuk meluncurkan pesawat dibanding konsep Rusia.Ini disebabkan sistenm Catapult dapat mendorong pesawat dengan muatan BBM dan senjata penuh beda dengan sistemn di Varyag saat ini.
Untuk itulah mereka menjalin kerjasama dengan Brazil dalam pelatihan awak dan tentunya dengan diam2 dengan prancis tentunya sebagai pemasok setia PLA sejak tahun 1970 an



hmm adik2ya liaoning bakal spt CDG? kok ga yakin ya

mengingat, andalan PLAN buat CV aviation bukannya J-15 nantinya? scr fisik masih spt Su-33 AFAIK. alias pswtnya bongsor2...
klo sekelas CDG, kapasitas angkut aviasinya nge-drop dong
hhg2 - 15/10/2012 10:54 PM
#27

All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier

All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier

All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier
sturmgewehr - 16/10/2012 12:03 AM
#28

Quote:
Original Posted By hhg2
All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier

All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier


itu di dek sprinkler utk kebakaran ?
cherrypopper - 16/10/2012 12:13 AM
#29

Quote:
Original Posted By sturmgewehr
itu di dek sprinkler utk kebakaran ?


yupppp... betul sekali..
merkapa - 18/10/2012 06:17 PM
#30

Spoiler for rebuilding on Dalian
All About Liaoning first Zhongguo CarrierAll About Liaoning first Zhongguo CarrierAll About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier
merkapa - 18/10/2012 06:28 PM
#31

Quote:
Aircraft carrier needs three stages to achieve combat effectiveness

Aircraft carrier needs three stages to achieve combat effectiveness

(Source: People's Daily Online) 2012-10-18

  The delivery of an aircraft carrier is not the end of an aircraft carrier project, especially when the carrier-based aircraft are not delivered. It is just an important result of a stage in an aircraft carrier project because the supporting weapons and carrier-based aircraft systems need to be further tested. It still needs a longer period of time for the aircraft carrier to form a joint combat effectiveness together with the aircraft carrier battle group and submarine.

  Generally speaking, after the aircraft carrier is delivered, it needs three stages to form combat effectiveness and the ability of global deployment.

  First stage: Sea test after delivery

  According to sources, an aircraft carrier will first enter a sea test of 18 months (an aircraft carrier is developed for the first time) or 12 months (not the first time to make it) after delivery to ensure that both crew and equipment meet the requirements of performing combat deployment tasks, which include loading and unloading of goods and materials and equipment, residential checks, preparation period of going to sea, tests and trial voyages before being sent back and final contract trials.

  Second stage: Being sent back after delivery and tests

  The period of being sent back to shipyard after delivery, which normally lasts for several months, is a typical maintenance stage in the early phase of the whole life cycle, aiming to amend the problems in the final contract tests and troubles found and postponed to be solved in the check of trial voyages and upgrade the carrier-based system. The shipyard bearing the task after being sent back is similar to the shipyard of goods and materials and equipment because it is familiar with the aircraft carrier.

  Third stage: Combat deployment preparation and training period

  The training for preparedness against war is the responsibility of the fleet forces command where the aircraft carrier is in, including the tests of air defense operation system, anti-submarine warfare system, anti-ship combat system, combat warfare system and flying of carrier-based aircrafts group, as well as certificated examination to crew and their operation capacity.

  During the training period, the crew must accept comprehensive training to adapt to the aviation facilities of the aircraft carrier, such as the battle station exercises of dragging, rescuing and refueling and battle station operation exercises on duty. The training and examination of operating personnel on takeoff and landing of the carrier-based aircraft are also essential. Before the new aircraft carrier enters formal service, the specialized technician personnel must have a comprehensive flight deck inspection including the distributed architecture, rigidity, strength and conditions of taking off and landing.

Editor:dongzhaohui


http://www.china-defense.com/
KeJoRaLead - 18/10/2012 06:31 PM
#32

Quote:
Original Posted By devanwidharta

Spoiler for radar/sonar/sensor n kok tempatnya disitu
All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier


itu yang namanya meatball. buat tau sudut approach pesawat yang mau landing udah bener atau belum

Spoiler for "meatball"

All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier
All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier
All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier
kasamago - 18/10/2012 07:09 PM
#33

jumlah sprinkles nya mantab.. ngirit biaya petugas pel..
blueret - 19/10/2012 12:12 AM
#34

Quote:
hyuga? bukannya mrk dah niat buat DDH 22

ngambil postingannya bro nicoz


arms race getting faster and hotter... D

maap om merk... agak OOT... tapi arms race di asia timur menarik banget, apalagi dari aspek maritim


Jadi inget kisah WW2 waktu Kriegsmarine bikin pocketbattleship. Apa yang diumumkan beda sama yang dibangun.
merkapa - 19/10/2012 05:35 PM
#35

Part I

Quote:
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38069&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=c483075834de91ea310e5f9f111493c3
Near-Term Missions for China’s Maiden Aircraft Carrier
Publication: China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 11
June 17, 2011 06:11 PM Age: 10 days
By: Aaron Shraberg

As China’s maiden aircraft carrier nears its sea trials one question that evades analysts’ minds is why China is building a carrier. For many of the carrier’s potential missions: from “recovering” Taiwan; to “solving” the Paracel, Spratly and Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands disputes; to “safeguarding” China’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), a fully operational carrier is considered logistically unattainable, at least in the near term. While several of the above missions may figure into a long-term strategic calculus, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) must first undergo an extensive period of trials, testing and training before the ship is mission-ready to the extent that it will be useful for China’s most vexing regional and international flashpoints. Yet, the meaning the Chinese officials, experts, press and even everyday Chinese people assign to an aircraft carrier seems to imply otherwise.

Major General Luo Yuan states: “for China to own a carrier is normal…an aircraft carrier is a symbol of the power of a great nation” (Xilu.com, March 4). The carrier is described by PLA Air Force Colonel Dai Xu as “a silent deterrent (wusheng weishe) against hegemonism” and a “totem [tuteng]” (Xinhua News Agency, June 2, 2010). Chinese commentators have touted the acquisition and refitting of the carrier as a “turning point” (zhuanzhe dian) (News.yard.cc). Citing the United States’ use of an aircraft carrier to face successive post-World War II crises, an article from the official Xinhua News Agency states that an aircraft carrier is the embodiment of a kind of “discourse power” (huayuquan) (Xinhua News Agency, July 29, 2010). In describing “discourse power,” the article says, “an aircraft carrier is the barometer of international relations in East Asia. When a carrier’s presence is unknown, Asia has ‘boundless blues skies’; yet when it is known, it becomes ‘rainy.’ But everyone acknowledges that the aircraft carrier is a manifestation of ‘discourse power.’ As in the United States’ experiences in various post-war international crises, American hegemony is inseparably linked to the aircraft carrier” (Xinhua News Agency, July 29, 2010). Another article in the popular Chinese Communist Party (CCP) weekly Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao) is titled “Reality and experience demonstrate that it is hard to be a great nation without an aircraft carrier” (shishi yu jingyan biaoming mei hangmu nancheng daguo) (Huanqiu Shibao, December 3, 2010). The majority of readers’ comments about articles on the buildup of an aircraft carrier seem to fully endorse the idea. One Global Times reader wrote: “I wish the mother country could have her own carrier soon!” Another reader went so far as to say: “I can endure being poor, but I cannot endure that China does not have an aircraft carrier” [1].

Background of the Maiden Carrier

The Nationalist (Kuomintang) government under Chiang Kai-shek had carriers as part of its navy development plan in the 1940s. In fact, as early as in 1928, a plan for building carriers at the cost of 20 million yuan was suggested to Generalissimo Chiang [2]. Commander of the PLAN from 1982 to 1987 and Chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1989 to 1997, Admiral Liu Huaqing, considered the father of the modern PLAN, advocated the acquisition of aircraft carriers starting in the 1980s as part of his vision of transforming the PLA Navy into a blue-water navy (People.com.cn, January 23). Since that time, the development of a carrier has been stymied by official retirements such as Liu’s in 1997, and a slew of technological challenges including acquiring and developing highly advanced electronic warfare and radar systems. Even getting the carrier from Ukraine to China proved tricky (it was held up near Turkey’s Bosporus Strait for 15 months). As You Ji and Ian Storey point out, Soviet influence in terms of “operational doctrine, campaign theory, and combat tactics” have also hindered the PLAN’s transition to blue-water capability [3].

However, a new generation of doctrine seeks to increase China’s joint-operations capabilities (Xinhua News Agency, March 31). China’s 2010 Ocean Development Report implies that China intended to build a carrier at least since 2003. 6]. Yet, other analysts have pointed out that “a carrier force operating east of Taiwan could attack the island’s air defense forces on two fronts if the PLA were able to coordinate carrier-based attacks with shore-based attacks from the mainland” [7]. That may be true. Nevertheless, in order for this to happen, joint-operations capabilities are a prerequisite, which are unattainable in the near term.

For the Paracel Islands (claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan) and the Spratly Islands (claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei), a carrier “will provide China with sustainable air cover for the long-range power projection needed to seize and hold disputed territory” [8]. Yet, carrying out these missions is largely dependent on air power at sea. Pilots will have to initially undergo a prolonged period of training before they can take off and land with any confidence. Even then, repairs due to the wear and tear on day-to-day carrier operations, the ship and its air-wing, present a whole new set of challenges that will likely take years to iron out.

Naval experts note that in order for China’s carrier to present any formidable challenge, it must integrate a battle-group, which customarily includes at least one frigate, one destroyer, a supply ship, and submarine support. The lack of qualified personnel, the foundation of a fully-functional battle-group, has been acknowledged by the PLAN as a priority that needs to be reformed (See “PLA Navy Expands Recruitment Drive to Enhance Operational Capability,” China Brief, May 20). A carrier without a well-trained crew, supporting vessels and the critical coordination that goes with it can be a floating target. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper acknowledges China’s challenges in the development of joint operation capabilities, calling for an increasing focus on “enhancing integrated support capabilities” (Xinhua News Agency, March 31). As China completes its carrier, an increase in submarine purchases by Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore advances China’s regional neighbors’ “sea-denial” capabilities [9]. Moreover, some countries in the region already constructed airstrips, including a 1,200m runway built on Itu Aba, another 1,350m runway built by Malaysia, and another 1,000m runway on a Philippines-occupied reef [10]. These factors all temper the regional force projection power of a carrier.

For the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands dispute, a carrier—both defensive and offensive in nature—would be effective as a psychological deterrent, but it risks sailing China into a maritime conflict with a formidable naval force beyond its own, namely Japan and the United States. China has intensified patrols by surveillance ships, submarines, and combat vessels in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in recent years. The presence of a large carrier in the same zones would create a more brute show of force. Any Chinese or U.S. naval expert grounded in reality will say that a near-term conflict involving a Chinese carrier would be unfavorable to any future Chinese force projection scenarios beyond the first island chain.
merkapa - 19/10/2012 05:38 PM
#36

Part II

Quote:
Possible Near-Term Uses of the Maiden Carrier

As to what role the carrier will play in safeguarding the Malacca Strait and other Chinese SLOCs, the carrier would allow China to better protect its own interests, such as shipments of oil and gas from western Burma (Myanmar) (South China Morning Post Online, June 3). China’s deployment of convoys to the Gulf of Aden/ Horn of Africa as an anti-piracy naval fleet have made the Chinese navy more aware of its limitations in performing naval operations far from China’s shores. For instance, the absence of basing arrangements to support the PLA Navy’s far sea missions will continue to challenge China’s long range missions (South China Morning Post Online, June 3). Yet, these missions may offer a preview of the type of mission a Chinese carrier could effectively carry out in the near term, maybe within the next 10 years. China’s anti-piracy missions, for example “escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia,” are mentioned in China’s 2010 Defense White Paper as included in military operations other than war (MOOTW) [11]. MOOTW also includes “organizing naval vessels for drills in distant waters,” “air security for major national events, emergency rescue and disaster relief, international rescue, and emergency airlift” [12]. China’s use of the carrier to support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions both regionally and outside Asia, also an achievable near-term mission for the carrier, would integrate China’s carrier into the international system in a benign fashion, as China has done with its new hospital ship, Peace Ark (heping fangzhou).

In the near term, the PLAN might also utilize the carrier for foreign port visits. Kenneth Allen and Heidi Holz point out that, “PLA military diplomacy is not regarded as a freestanding set of activities with its own intrinsic value, but rather as a vehicle for furthering the Party-State’s strategic national objectives” [13]. Port visits allow China to “show the flag,” impress the people of each port the carrier visits and further military-to-military exchange.

Conclusion

The real weight of the carrier program on the balance of power in Asia is several years coming, at the earliest after the carrier completes its initial sea trials and its airmen are trained. During this time, developing joint-operation capabilities and maintenance for the ship and its air-wing will cost China more time and money. Meanwhile, to China’s neighbors, the carrier’s presence is clear and present. A recent rise in “sea denial” strategies by Southeast Asian nations, perhaps in response to China’s attempt at “sea control” as symbolized in the maiden carrier, is evidenced by an increase in submarine purchases by Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. Thus, the actual mission-effectiveness of a carrier decreases, especially for China’s most vexing regional flashpoints, as the region responds. Meanwhile, China’s maiden carrier is being outpaced in the face of new U.S. technologies such as jet-powered killer drones (Wired, June 1). Against this dynamic backdrop, a “70-year dream” is now coming true, due in no small part to the CCP, and the Chinese government can continue to stoke up the national pride of its own people. The symbol of the carrier allows them to do that. Yet, the massive investment in time, technology, talent and money means that a lot is riding on the carrier. China watchers and military experts will continue to monitor the maiden carrier, a dream no longer deferred, to better understand the PLAN’s real capabilities, and China’s expectations for this and any future carriers.

Notes:

1. Information accessed at: http://www.huanqiu.com/content_comment.php?tid=1312758&mid=1&cid=87
2. Beijing Zhongguo Guojia Dili, [Chinese National Geography], 233.
3. Ian Storey and You JI, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors.” Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/art6-w04.htm.
4. “China’s Ocean Development Report (2010)” [Zhongguo Haiyang Fazhan Baogao (2010)], edited by Gao Zhiguo and published by People’s Daily Press, April 2010.
5. Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2006, Vol. 59, No. 4. 27.
6. Ibid.
7. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the 21st Century, Second Edition, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010. 153.
8. Cole, 153.
9. Christian Le Miere, “Waves of concern: Southeast Asian States Plan Naval Defenses,” Jane’s, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 2011.
10. Le Miere, 13.
11. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 31 March, 2011, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” VII. Defense Expenditure. Available at: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-03/31/content_22263774.htm.
12. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, March 31, 2011, “China’s National Defense in 2010, III. Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army,” Available at: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-03/31/content_22263445.htm.
13. Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen, “Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics: The People’s Liberation Army Experience with Military Relations,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, eds. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, Andrew Scobell, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute. 433. Available at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar
epstein - 20/10/2012 09:49 AM
#37

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Home > CASCISCUS > MILITER & KEPOLISIAN > Militer > All About Liaoning first Zhongguo Carrier